The Controlled Substances Act Is Not a Blunt Instrument — It Is an Architecture of Exceptions

The Controlled Substances Act Is Not a Blunt Instrument — It Is an Architecture of Exceptions

By Jason Karimi | WeedPress | February 13, 2026

A recent Harvard Law Review–discussed argument (as reviewed in Drug Scheduling Is Institutional Design — And That Changes Everything) suggests the Controlled Substances Act (CSA) is structurally imperfect — designed for prohibition rather than regulation — and therefore in need of legislative overhaul.

That framing misunderstands the statute’s architecture.

The CSA was not written as a frozen prohibition code. It was written as a regulatory framework with built-in exception authority — and Congress connected the dots deliberately.

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The Starting Point: 21 U.S.C. § 822(d)

(d)Waiver

“The Attorney General may, by regulation, waive the requirement for registration of certain manufacturers, distributors, ordispensers if he finds it consistent with the public health and safety.”

https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/21/822

§ 822(d) authorizes the Attorney General to waive certain registration requirements for any controlled substance activity, provided it’s consistent with public health and safety.

That is not accidental language. That is delegation.

In Gonzales v. O Centro Espírita Beneficente União do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418 (2006), the Supreme Court upheld an exemption for the União do Vegetal’s sacramental use of ayahuasca because the government failed to prove that applying the Controlled Substances Act to that use furthered a compelling interest in public health and safety under RFRA, supporting the conclusion that such an exemption was consistent with public health and safety.

The hinge provision is 21 U.S.C. § 822(d). That subsection authorizes the Attorney General to “waive” or “except” certain registration requirements when consistent with the statute’s structure and purpose.

That is not accidental language. It is delegation.

Congress did not draft a rigid command-and-control scheme. It created a general rule (registration and control) and then embedded an exception mechanism within the statute itself.

The CSA anticipates administrative calibration.

Authorized Activities

Registered individuals or entities are authorized to possess, manufacture, distribute, or dispense controlled substances as per their registration. However, certain individuals, such as employees of registered entities acting within the scope of their employment, are not required to register.

Exemptions

Some individuals, like common carriers or ultimate users, may possess controlled substances without needing to register, provided their actions comply with specific legal provisions.

This framework ensures that the handling of controlled substances is regulated to prevent misuse and protect public health.

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The Regulatory Implementation: 21 C.F.R. Part 1307

The regulatory counterpart is 21 C.F.R. Part 1307, titled Miscellaneous. It exists because § 822(d) exists.

1307.03 allows anyone to apply for an exception:

§ 1307.03 Exceptions to regulations.

“Any person may apply for an exception to the application of any provision of this chapter by filing a written request with the Office of Diversion Control, Drug Enforcement Administration, stating the reasons for such exception. See the Table of DEA Mailing Addresses in § 1321.01 of this chapter for the current mailing address. The Administrator may grant an exception in his discretion, but in no case shall he/she be required to grant an exception to any person which is otherwise required by law or the regulations cited in this section.” https://www.ecfr.gov/current/title-21/chapter-II/part-1307/subject-group-ECFRe9876b995678379/section-1307.03

Part 1307 contains exception mechanisms — including exemptions, waivers, and special categories that adjust how controlled substance requirements apply in specific contexts. It is not decorative. It operationalizes Congress’s delegation.

The structure is simple:
• Statute (21 U.S.C. § 822(d)) → grants exception authority.
• Regulation (21 C.F.R. Part 1307) → implements that authority.

That is not prohibition architecture. That is administrative design.

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The CSA’s Design: Regulation With Guardrails

The CSA’s stated purpose is to prevent drug abuse while protecting public health and safety. Those two objectives operate together. They are not mutually exclusive.

Exceptions consistent with public health and safety are not “drug abuse.” They are statutory compliance.

When Congress writes a law that:
1. Establishes a scheduling framework,
2. Delegates authority to the executive branch, and
3. Provides an exception pathway through waiver provisions,

—it is not writing a static ban. It is writing a regulatory system.

This is why the CSA integrates:
• Scheduling authority (21 U.S.C. § 811),
• Registration requirements (21 U.S.C. § 822),
• Administrative rulemaking under the Administrative Procedure Act,
• And regulatory implementation through the Code of Federal Regulations.

That is institutional design, not legislative oversight.

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Where the Disagreement Lies

The Harvard Law Review–discussed thesis suggests the CSA is imperfect because it was built for prohibition and cannot accommodate modern regulatory realities without Congress rewriting it.

I disagree — respectfully — on structural grounds.

The CSA already contains:
• Delegated authority,
• Waiver provisions,
• Administrative flexibility,
• Public health framing,
• And regulatory implementation mechanisms.

The statute does not forbid exceptions. It authorizes them.

The key question is not whether the CSA is incapable of regulation.
The key question is whether the delegated authority within § 822(d) and related provisions is being interpreted as narrowly as possible — or as Congress intended.

That is an institutional interpretation issue, not a statutory design failure.

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The Federalism Stress Test

Modern cannabis policy exposes tension not because the CSA is broken, but because the executive branch has chosen particular interpretations of its discretion.

If Congress had intended absolute prohibition with no flexibility, it would not have written waiver authority into § 822(d). Nor would it have structured scheduling as an administrative process subject to evidence and rulemaking.

The CSA was drafted in 1970, but it was not drafted blindly. It anticipated evolving scientific and regulatory conditions.

The statute can accommodate exceptions consistent with public health and safety because Congress wrote it to do exactly that.

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A Clarification — Not an Attack

This is not a critique of scholarship. It is a clarification of statutory structure.

The disagreement is narrow:

• The Harvard framing treats the CSA as fundamentally prohibitionist in design.
• This analysis treats it as a regulatory statute with prohibition as a default rule — and exceptions as a delegated safety valve.

That difference matters.

If the CSA is structurally flexible, then reform debates shift from “Congress must rewrite the statute” to “the executive branch must fully exercise the authority Congress already granted.”

That is a very different conversation. That conversation opens up new avenues of relief and opportunity for real change using existing frameworks rather than wasting time lobbying for new legislation.

We don’t need new legislation. We need advocates understanding the structure of the CSA correctly then using that structure in filing petitions with administrative agencies. The UDV ayahuasca case explained the exemption granted for ayahuasca was granted because it was consistent with public health and safety:

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Conclusion

Drug laws were written to prevent drug abuse. Exceptions consistent with public health and safety are not drug abuse. They are part of the system Congress designed.

The Controlled Substances Act is not a blunt instrument. It is an administrative architecture — one that links 21 U.S.C. § 822(d) to 21 C.F.R. Part 1307 for a reason.

Whether that architecture is being fully utilized is a policy question.

But the statute itself was written with the dots already connected.

TLDR:

Thesis: state programs are authorized exceptions consistent with public health and safety

Enforcement: statutory 21 usc 822(d)

Provisioning mechanism: regulation, 1307.03 and the entire chapter of cfr 1307

Simple.

It’s not a religious exemption like lawyers think it’s an 822(d) exemption consistent with public health and safety the language from 822(d) UDV court explained.

I rest my case.