The Controlled Substances Act Is Not a Blunt Instrument — It Is an Architecture of Exceptions
By Jason Karimi | WeedPress Policy Series #4| February 13, 2026
A recent Harvard Law Review–discussed argument (as reviewed in Drug Scheduling Is Institutional Design — And That Changes Everything) suggests the Controlled Substances Act (CSA) is structurally imperfect — designed for prohibition rather than regulation — and therefore in need of legislative overhaul.
That framing misunderstands the statute’s architecture.
The CSA was not written as a frozen prohibition code. It was written as a regulatory framework with built-in exception authority — and Congress connected the dots deliberately.
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The Starting Point
21 U.S.C. § 822(d) says:
(d)Waiver
“The Attorney General may, by regulation, waive the requirement for registration of certain manufacturers, distributors, ordispensers if he finds it consistent with the public health and safety.”
https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/21/822
§ 822(d) authorizes the Attorney General to waive certain registration requirements for any controlled substance activity, provided it’s consistent with public health and safety.
That is not accidental language. That is delegation.
Whether § 822(d) permits narrow procedural waivers or broader categorical exemptions is a matter of interpretation — but the statute unmistakably contemplates exception authority within the regulatory scheme.
Section 822(d) operates within the broader structure of the CSA’s scheduling and enforcement provisions and does not eliminate those constraints.
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In Gonzales v. O Centro Espírita Beneficente União do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418 (2006), the Supreme Court upheld an exemption for the União do Vegetal’s sacramental use of ayahuasca because the government failed to prove that applying the Controlled Substances Act to that use furthered a compelling interest in public health and safety under RFRA, supporting the conclusion that such an exemption was consistent with public health and safety.
Although UDV was decided under RFRA rather than § 822(d), it confirms that the CSA’s application is not absolute and that exemptions consistent with public health and safety are structurally compatible with the statute.
The regulatory mechanism for such exceptions appears in the regulation 21 C.F.R. Part 1307. The hinge provision is 21 U.S.C. § 822(d). That statutory subsection authorizes the Attorney General to “waive” or “except” certain registration requirements when consistent with the statute’s structure and purpose.
Congress did not draft a rigid command-and-control scheme. It created a general rule (registration and control) and then embedded an exception mechanism within the statute itself.
The CSA anticipates administrative calibration.
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Authorized Activities
Registered individuals or entities are authorized to possess, manufacture, distribute, or dispense controlled substances as per their registration. However, certain individuals, such as employees of registered entities acting within the scope of their employment, are not required to register.
Exemptions
Some individuals, like common carriers or ultimate users, may possess controlled substances without needing to register, provided their actions comply with specific legal provisions.
This framework ensures that the handling of controlled substances is regulated to prevent misuse and protect public health.
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The Regulatory Implementation: 21 C.F.R. Part 1307
Examples of Active Exception Mechanisms in 21 C.F.R. Part 1307
Part 1307 is not symbolic. It contains real, operational exception provisions, including:
• § 1307.03 — Application for Exception
Allows any person to apply to the DEA for an exception to the application of any provision of the CSA’s implementing regulations. This is a direct procedural gateway for individualized exemptions.
• § 1307.11 — Distribution Between Practitioners
Permits limited distribution of controlled substances by one practitioner to another under specified conditions, recognizing practical medical realities.
• § 1307.31 — Native American Church Peyote Exemption
Codifies an exemption for bona fide religious use of peyote, demonstrating that categorical religious exceptions coexist within the CSA framework.
• § 1307.41 — Temporary Telemedicine Flexibilities
Implements regulatory accommodations allowing prescribing without in-person evaluations under defined circumstances, reflecting adaptive public health administration.
The regulatory counterpart is 21 C.F.R. Part 1307, titled Miscellaneous. It exists because § 822(d) exists.
1307.03 allows anyone to apply for an exception:
§ 1307.03 Exceptions to regulations.
“Any person may apply for an exception to the application of any provision of this chapter by filing a written request with the Office of Diversion Control, Drug Enforcement Administration, stating the reasons for such exception. See the Table of DEA Mailing Addresses in § 1321.01 of this chapter for the current mailing address. The Administrator may grant an exception in his discretion, but in no case shall he/she be required to grant an exception to any person which is otherwise required by law or the regulations cited in this section.” https://www.ecfr.gov/current/title-21/chapter-II/part-1307/subject-group-ECFRe9876b995678379/section-1307.03
Part 1307 contains exception mechanisms — including exemptions, waivers, and special categories that adjust how controlled substance requirements apply in specific contexts. It is not decorative. It operationalizes Congress’s delegation.
The structure is simple:
• Statute (21 U.S.C. § 822(d)) → grants exception authority.
• Regulation (21 C.F.R. Part 1307) → implements that authority.
That is not prohibition architecture. That is administrative design.
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The Regulatory Implementation: 21 C.F.R. Part 1307
The delegation in 21 U.S.C. § 822(d) is not abstract. It is operationalized in 21 C.F.R. Part 1307, titled Miscellaneous, which functions as the regulatory vehicle for exception authority under the Controlled Substances Act.
Part 1307 confirms that the CSA’s framework contemplates structured exemptions administered through rulemaking and agency discretion. It includes:
• § 1307.03 — Application for Exception.
Authorizes any person to apply for an exception to the application of the DEA’s regulations. This provision establishes a formal mechanism for individualized relief.
• § 1307.11 — Distribution Between Practitioners.
Permits limited transfers of controlled substances between registered practitioners under defined conditions, recognizing medical and logistical realities within the regulatory system.
• § 1307.31 — Native American Church Peyote Exemption.
Codifies a categorical religious exemption, demonstrating that the CSA accommodates defined, durable exceptions within its regulatory structure.
• § 1307.41 — Temporary Telemedicine Flexibilities.
Reflects adaptive regulatory authority allowing prescribing accommodations in response to public health circumstances.
These provisions are not anomalies. They are evidence of design. Part 1307 operates as the implementation layer for Congress’s delegated authority — translating statutory discretion into administrable exceptions.
The existence of both individualized and categorical exemptions within Part 1307 undermines the claim that the CSA is structurally incapable of regulation. Prohibition is the default rule. Exception authority is the safety valve. Both are built into the same statutory architecture.
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The CSA’s Design: Regulation With Guardrails
The CSA’s stated purpose is to prevent drug abuse while protecting public health and safety. Those two objectives operate together. They are not mutually exclusive.
Exceptions consistent with public health and safety are not “drug abuse.” They are statutory compliance.
When Congress writes a law that:
1. Establishes a scheduling framework,
2. Delegates authority to the executive branch, and
3. Provides an exception pathway through waiver provisions,
—it is not writing a static ban. It is writing a regulatory system.
This is why the CSA integrates:
• Scheduling authority (21 U.S.C. § 811),
• Registration requirements (21 U.S.C. § 822),
• Administrative rulemaking under the Administrative Procedure Act,
• And regulatory implementation through the Code of Federal Regulations.
That is institutional design, not legislative oversight.
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Where the Disagreement Lies
The Harvard Law Review–discussed thesis suggests the CSA is imperfect because it was built for prohibition and cannot accommodate modern regulatory realities without Congress rewriting it.
I disagree — respectfully — on structural grounds.
The CSA already contains:
• Delegated authority,
• Waiver provisions,
• Administrative flexibility,
• Public health framing,
• And regulatory implementation mechanisms.
The statute does not forbid exceptions. It authorizes them.
The key question is not whether the CSA is incapable of regulation.
The key question is whether the delegated authority within § 822(d) and related provisions is being interpreted as narrowly as possible — or as Congress intended.
That is an institutional interpretation issue, not a statutory design failure.
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The Federalism Stress Test
Modern cannabis policy exposes tension not because the CSA is broken, but because the executive branch has chosen particular interpretations of its discretion.
If Congress had intended absolute prohibition with no flexibility, it would not have written waiver authority into § 822(d). Nor would it have structured scheduling as an administrative process subject to evidence and rulemaking.
The CSA was drafted in 1970, but it was not drafted blindly. It anticipated evolving scientific and regulatory conditions.
The statute can accommodate exceptions consistent with public health and safety because Congress wrote it to do exactly that.
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A Clarification — Not an Attack
This is not a critique of scholarship. It is a clarification of statutory structure.
The disagreement is narrow:
• The Harvard framing treats the CSA as fundamentally prohibitionist in design.
• This analysis treats it as a regulatory statute with prohibition as a default rule — and exceptions as a delegated safety valve.
That difference matters.
If the CSA is structurally flexible, then reform debates shift from “Congress must rewrite the statute” to “the executive branch must fully exercise the authority Congress already granted.”
That is a very different conversation. That conversation opens up new avenues of relief and opportunity for real change using existing frameworks rather than wasting time lobbying for new legislation.
We don’t need new legislation. We need advocates understanding the structure of the CSA correctly then using that structure in filing petitions with administrative agencies. The UDV ayahuasca case explained the exemption granted for ayahuasca was granted because it was consistent with public health and safety:
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Conclusion
Drug laws were written to prevent drug abuse. Exceptions consistent with public health and safety are not drug abuse. They are part of the system Congress designed.
The Controlled Substances Act is not a blunt instrument. It is an administrative architecture — one that links 21 U.S.C. § 822(d) to 21 C.F.R. Part 1307 for a reason.
Whether that architecture is being fully utilized is a policy question.
But the statute itself was written with the dots already connected.
If § 822(d) and Part 1307 are read according to their plain structure, the executive branch may already possess more regulatory flexibility than many reform advocates assume.
What would a lawful exercise of that flexibility actually look like?
That possibility reframes the debate. The question may not be whether Congress must rewrite the statute, but whether existing delegated authority has been fully understood and exercised.
The Controlled Substances Act was drafted as a regulatory architecture. Whether it functions as one depends on how its exception authority is interpreted and applied.
TLDR:
Thesis: state programs are authorized exceptions consistent with public health and safety
Enforcement: statutory 21 usc 822(d)
Provisioning mechanism: regulation, 1307.03 and the entire chapter of cfr 1307
Simple.
It’s not necessarily a religious exemption like lawyers think it’s an 822(d) exemption consistent with public health and safety the language from 822(d) UDV court explained. In Gonzales v. O Centro Espírita Beneficente União do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418 (2006), the Supreme Court affirmed an injunction allowing a religious group to use hoasca (ayahuasca) because the government failed to demonstrate a compelling interest in barring that use under the CSA as implemented, an implicit acknowledgment that application of the CSA must be consistent with public health and safety objectives
The CSA was drafted as a regulatory architecture with default prohibitions and structured exception authority. Whether it functions as a blunt instrument or as designed depends on how that authority is understood and exercised.
The fight for cannabis justice isn’t legislative. It’s interpretative. Go study those laws closer. This article is meant to survive a stress test from opposing counsel.
I, for now, rest my case.
This article is intended as an interpretive inquiry into the scope of delegated exception authority within the Controlled Substances Act — not as an assertion of unlimited executive power. Any exercise of § 822(d) authority would necessarily operate within the CSA’s broader scheduling and enforcement framework and would remain subject to judicial review under established administrative law principles.
WeedPress is a policy analysis publication focused on statutory interpretation, administrative procedure, and institutional design in cannabis law.
WeedPress Policy Series No. 4
Title: The Controlled Substances Act Is Not a Blunt Instrument — It Is an Architecture of Exceptions (February 13th, 2026)
Author: Jason Karimi
Publication: WeedPress
About Weedpress Policy Series
The Weedpress Policy Series publishes in-depth, citation-supported analysis of federal cannabis law, regulatory policy, and enforcement practices. The series is designed to provide lawmakers, attorneys, journalists, and stakeholders with legally grounded, non-activist, non-promotional analysis focused on statutory reality and institutional accountability.
Weedpress Policy Series emphasizes:
• Federal statutory interpretation
• Congressional intent and legislative history
• Treaty and international law implications
• Administrative law and agency authority
• Oversight of enforcement discretion and regulatory gaps
WeedPress Policy Series
No. 1 — Legal Memorandum: Common Misconceptions in Cannabis Activism Regarding Federal Drug Law (January 25, 2026)
No. 2 — The Path to a Religious Cannabis Exemption: How Medical Cannabis Systems Change the RFRA Equation(January 27, 2026)
No. 3 — Structural Contradictions and Prospective Litigation Risk in Post-Rescheduling Cannabis Policy (February 6, 2026)
No. 4 — The Controlled Substances Act Is Not a Blunt Instrument — It Is an Architecture of Exceptions (February 13, 2026)
No. 5 — The Limits of § 822(d): What It Does — and Does Not — Authorize (February 13, 2026)
WeedPress: The Paper Trail 
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