This summer I intend to file a civil action against the State of South Dakota seeking a judicial declaration that the state’s Schedule I classification of marijuana no longer satisfies the statutory criteria required for Schedule I placement under South Dakota law.¹ The claim is straightforward: once the factual predicate of “no accepted medical use” no longer exists, continued Schedule I treatment raises questions of statutory validity, due process, and administrative irrationality.²
This action is not born of personal grievance. It follows years of public research and a proposition rooted in ordinary rule-of-law principles: when the underlying factual assumptions supporting a legal classification materially change, courts may be asked to determine whether the classification can continue unchanged.³
The Federal Shift That Changes Everything
On April 23, 2026, the U.S. Department of Justice issued a final order placing FDA-approved marijuana products and marijuana products subject to qualifying state-issued medical marijuana licenses into Schedule III.⁴ The Department also set an expedited administrative hearing beginning June 29, 2026, to consider broader questions surrounding national scheduling.⁵
Acting Attorney General Todd Blanche grounded the order in treaty obligations under 21 U.S.C. § 811(d)(1) and the Single Convention, while expressly recognizing that state-regulated medical systems have demonstrated sustained public-health and diversion-control capacity.⁶
That matters because South Dakota’s Schedule I criteria still mirror the classic federal formulation: high abuse potential, no currently accepted medical use, and lack of accepted safety under medical supervision.⁷ Marijuana remains listed under that framework in South Dakota.⁸
But if federal law now recognizes accepted medical use for regulated marijuana products, a serious legal question emerges whether a state classification premised on no accepted medical use can remain intact without legislative or judicial reevaluation.⁹
That is not a political slogan. It is a statutory-construction question.¹⁰
Indeed, I outlined a version of this argument in a 2024 draft motion to dismiss cannabis charges, arguing widespread state medical recognition had already undermined the logic of Schedule I under 21 U.S.C. § 812(b)(1)(B).¹¹ This lawsuit seeks to place that issue directly before a court through declaratory relief.¹²
The WeedPress Record
This issue did not appear overnight.
WeedPress has tracked the scheduling contradiction for years.¹³ In January I argued federal rescheduling would expose mismatches in state controlled-substances laws that mechanically retained obsolete assumptions.¹⁴
On April 26 I detailed how Minnesota moved naturally occurring tetrahydrocannabinols into Schedule III long before the current federal shift, illustrating that state alignment is neither radical nor unprecedented.¹⁵
Other states are now wrestling openly with the same problem. Tennessee enacted legislation preventing automatic state rescheduling spillover absent legislative approval.¹⁶ West Virginia and Mississippi introduced bills moving cannabis toward Schedule III treatment.¹⁷ Indiana has seen contingent proposals tied to federal descheduling scenarios.¹⁸
Those developments differ in substance, but they share a common recognition: federal scheduling change destabilizes old state assumptions.¹⁹
South Dakota has not meaningfully addressed that problem.²⁰
That is what this case seeks to test.
Why Litigation
In prohibition politics, some issues simply do not move legislatively.
That is not cynicism. It is institutional reality.²¹
Where political systems stall, declaratory litigation sometimes becomes the lawful mechanism for resolving structural statutory disputes.²² Courts exist precisely to resolve whether enacted classifications still satisfy governing legal standards.²³
This suit is intended in that spirit.
Not to attack government.
Not to seek damages.
Not to grandstand.
But to ask whether South Dakota’s Schedule I designation remains legally sustainable after federal recognition of accepted medical use.²⁴
If the answer is yes, courts can say so.
If no, the legal system can begin correcting it.
Either result advances clarity.
A Note on Position and an Open Call for Legal Help
I have made mistakes over seventeen years of advocacy and learned from them. But I have devoted unusual sustained attention to scheduling doctrine, incorporation statutes, preemption problems, religious-accommodation precedents, and administrative records surrounding cannabis law.²⁵
I have no dispensary interest, no licensing interest, and no commercial stake in the outcome.²⁶
My interest is legal coherence, patient rights, and reducing unnecessary public costs.²⁷
Any attorney interested in discussing or collaborating is welcome to reach out. I particularly recommend consultation with Joseph Tully, whose litigation record in cannabis defense is extraordinary.²⁸
And, as background relevant to the seriousness of the theory, nearly a decade ago Michigan attorney Neil Rockind contacted me after reviewing Iowa scheduling arguments I had circulated publicly, expressed strong interest in the nullification theory, and credited aspects of that analysis as relevant to arguments that contributed to a major Michigan dismissal.²⁹ I mention that not as appeal to authority, but because the theory has drawn serious legal attention before.³⁰
This filing is intended as a serious good-faith attempt to resolve a structural issue others have identified but no one has squarely litigated in South Dakota.³¹
Why This Could Help Everyone
If successful, the case could reduce uncertainty for patients, prosecutors, courts, and regulators alike.³²
It could lower enforcement friction.³³
It could reduce long-term compliance costs.³⁴
It could bring South Dakota law into closer alignment with scientific and statutory realities.³⁵
And even if unsuccessful, a well-developed record could clarify the issue for legislative or appellate review.³⁶
That is not disruption.
That is institutional problem-solving.³⁷
I file it in that spirit.³⁸
The record is ready.
The federal facts have materially changed.³⁹
South Dakota patients and the rule of law deserve an answer.⁴⁰
Full complaint and supporting memorandum will be posted here once filed and served this summer.
Comments and records requests remain open as always.
The Paper Trail continues.
Patients first.
Footnotes
¹ S.D. Codified Laws § 34-20B-11 (2025) (setting forth Schedule I criteria); S.D. Codified Laws § 34-20B-14 (2025) (listing marijuana within Schedule I hallucinogenic substances).
² S.D. Codified Laws § 34-20B-11; U.S. Const. amend. XIV; S.D. Const. art. VI, §§ 2, 18.
³ See generally Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 42–43 (1983) (administrative action must be rationally explained); United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152–53 (1938) (recognizing rational-basis review of legislative facts).
⁴ U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Justice Department Places FDA-Approved Marijuana Products and Products Containing Marijuana Subject to a Qualifying State-issued License in Schedule III (Apr. 23, 2026).
⁵ Id. According to the Department’s announcement, the final order was immediate as to covered products, while broader scheduling issues were set for expedited administrative proceedings beginning June 29, 2026.
⁶ 21 U.S.C. § 811(d)(1) (authorizing scheduling action required by United States treaty obligations); Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs arts. 23, 28, Mar. 30, 1961, 18 U.S.T. 1407.
⁷ S.D. Codified Laws § 34-20B-11(1)–(3); see also 21 U.S.C. § 812(b)(1)(A)–(C) (federal Schedule I criteria).
⁸ S.D. Codified Laws § 34-20B-14.
⁹ 21 U.S.C. § 812(b)(1)(B); Grinspoon v. DEA, 828 F.2d 881, 886–87 (1st Cir. 1987) (rejecting DEA’s interpretation that accepted medical use required FDA approval alone).
¹⁰ See Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts 56–58 (2012) (ordinary-meaning canon) “Words are to be understood in their ordinary, everyday meanings—unless the context indicates that they bear a technical sense.”; id. at 69–77 (presumption of consistent usage) “A word or phrase is presumed to bear the same meaning throughout a text; a material variation in terms suggests a variation in meaning.”
¹¹ Jason Karimi, Respectable Draft To Dismiss Cannabis Charges, Nullify Schedule One As Matter Of Law and Not Science, WeedPress (Jan. 21, 2024).
¹² See S.D. Codified Laws ch. 21-24 (South Dakota declaratory judgment procedures); S.D. Codified Laws § 21-24-1 (courts may declare rights, status, and legal relations).
¹³ See WeedPress cannabis scheduling archive, 2021–2026.
¹⁴ Jason Karimi, Marijuana Rescheduling: What It Really Means for South Dakotans, WeedPress (Jan. 8, 2026).
¹⁵ Jason Karimi, Minnesota Was Arguing Schedule III Before Washington Caught Up, WeedPress (Apr. 26, 2026); Minn. Stat. § 152.02, subd. 3 (Schedule III).
¹⁶ Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-17-403, as amended by 2026 Tenn. Pub. Acts ch. 789; S.B. 1603, 114th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Tenn. 2026).
¹⁷ W. Va. S.B. 809, 87th Leg., Reg. Sess. (2026); Miss. H.B. 865, 2026 Reg. Sess.
¹⁸ See Indiana 2026 cannabis reform proposals and agency discussions concerning federal rescheduling or descheduling contingencies.
¹⁹ See Uniform Controlled Substances Act § 201, 9 U.L.A. 657–60 (2007) (model scheduling framework); 21 U.S.C. § 811; 21 U.S.C. § 812.
²⁰ S.D. Codified Laws § 34-20B-14; S.D. Codified Laws § 34-20B-11.
²¹ See generally The Federalist No. 78 (Alexander Hamilton) (courts as guardians of constitutional limits); Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
²² S.D. Codified Laws § 21-24-1; see also Steadman v. S.D. Bd. of Pardons & Paroles, 2015 S.D. 86, ¶ 7, 871 N.W.2d 555, 558 (declaratory judgment may determine legal rights where justiciable controversy exists).
²³ See State v. Outka, 2014 S.D. 11, ¶ 24, 844 N.W.2d 598, 606 (statutory interpretation begins with text); In re Estate of Flaws, 2016 S.D. 60, ¶ 25, 885 N.W.2d 336, 343 (courts construe statutes according to plain meaning).
²⁴ S.D. Codified Laws § 34-20B-11; S.D. Codified Laws § 34-20B-14; 21 U.S.C. § 812(b)(1).
²⁵ See Jason Karimi, WeedPress scheduling and cannabis-law articles, 2009–2026; see also administrative materials from HHS, FDA, DEA, and DOJ concerning cannabis scheduling, 2023–2026.
²⁶ See S.D. Const. art. VI, §§ 2, 18; S.D. Codified Laws ch. 34-20G.
²⁷ See S.D. Dep’t of Health, Medical Cannabis Program annual reports and fee materials, 2023–2026.
²⁸ See Joseph Tully, Tully & Weiss Attorneys at Law, published attorney biography and cannabis-defense case materials.
²⁹ Private correspondence and contemporaneous advocacy records concerning Iowa scheduling arguments and Michigan litigation theory, on file with author.
³⁰ Id.; see also Neil Rockind public professional biography and cannabis-defense litigation materials.
³¹ See S.D. Codified Laws ch. 21-24; S.D. Codified Laws §§ 34-20B-11, -14.
³² See S.D. Codified Laws ch. 34-20G; S.D. Dep’t of Health, Medical Cannabis Program annual reports, 2023–2026.
³³ See S.D. Codified Laws ch. 34-20B; S.D. Codified Laws ch. 34-20G.
³⁴ See S.D. Dep’t of Health fee schedules and program materials, 2023–2026.
³⁵ See U.S. Dep’t of Health & Hum. Servs., cannabis scheduling recommendation materials transmitted to DEA, 2023; FDA cannabis scheduling review materials, 2023–2026; DOJ Final Order, Apr. 23, 2026.
³⁶ See State v. Fifteen Impounded Cats, 2010 S.D. 50, ¶ 26, 785 N.W.2d 272, 281 (issues preserved for appeal through adequate record and argument); see also S.D. R. Civ. P. 52(a).
³⁷ See Marbury, 5 U.S. at 177; S.D. Const. art. V, § 1.
³⁸ S.D. Const. art. VI, §§ 2, 18; U.S. Const. amend. XIV.
³⁹ DOJ Final Order, supra note 4; 21 U.S.C. § 811(d)(1); 21 U.S.C. § 812(b)(1).
⁴⁰ Additional authorities expected in the complaint and supporting memorandum include Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005); Gonzales v. O Centro Espírita Beneficente União do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418 (2006); Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990); RFRA and state religious-accommodation authorities; Single Convention materials; HHS/FDA/DEA administrative records; South Dakota medical-cannabis statutes; and comparative medical-cannabis statutes from more than forty jurisdictions

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